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The cash ￿ ows of growth stocks are particularly sensitive to temporary movements
in aggregate stock prices (driven by movements in the equity risk premium), while
the cash ￿ ows of value stocks are particularly sensitive to permanent movements in
aggregate stock prices (driven by market-wide shocks to cash ￿ ows.) Thus the high
betas of growth stocks with the market￿ s discount-rate shocks, and of value stocks
with the market￿ s cash-￿ ow shocks, are determined by the cash-￿ ow fundamentals of
growth and value companies. Growth stocks are not merely ￿glamour stocks￿whose
systematic risks are purely driven by investor sentiment. More generally, accounting
measures of ￿rm-level risk have predictive power for ￿rms￿betas with market-wide
cash ￿ ows, and this predictive power arises from the behavior of ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows.
The systematic risks of stocks with similar accounting characteristics are primarily
driven by the systematic risks of their fundamentals.
JEL classi￿cation: G12, G14, N22Why do stock prices move together? If stocks are priced by discounting their
cash ￿ ows at a rate that is constant over time, although possibly varying across
stocks, then movements in stock prices are driven by news about cash ￿ ows. In
this case common variation in prices must be attributable to common variation in
cash ￿ ows. If discount rates vary over time, however, then groups of stocks can
move together because of common shocks to discount rates rather than fundamentals.
For example, a change in the market discount rate will have a particularly large
e⁄ect on the prices of stocks whose cash ￿ ows occur in the distant future (Cornell,
1999; Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman, 2004; Lettau and Wachter, 2007), so these stocks
will tend to rise together when the market discount rate declines, and fall together
when the market discount rate increases. It is also possible for groups of stocks
to experience changes in the discount rates applied to their cash ￿ ows speci￿cally.
In the extreme, irrational investor sentiment can cause common variation in stock
prices that is entirely unrelated to the characteristics of cash ￿ ows; Barberis, Shleifer,
and Wurgler (2005) and Greenwood (2005) suggest that this explains the common
movement of stocks that are included in the S&P 500 and Nikkei indexes.
Common variation in stock prices is particularly important when it a⁄ects the
measures of systematic risk that rational investors use to evaluate stocks. In the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the risk of each stock is measured by its beta
with the market portfolio, and it is natural to ask whether stocks￿market betas are
determined by shocks to their cash ￿ ows or their discount rates (Campbell and Mei
1993). Recently, Campbell (1993, 1996) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) have
proposed a version of Merton￿ s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model
(ICAPM), in which investors care more about permanent cash-￿ ow-driven movements
than about temporary discount-rate-driven movements in the aggregate stock market.
In their model, the required return on a stock is determined not by its overall beta
with the market, but by two separate betas, one with permanent cash-￿ ow shocks to
the market, and the other with temporary shocks to market discount rates. They call
the ￿rst beta with respect to cash-￿ ow shocks, ￿bad beta￿ , because investors demand
a high price to bear this risk. The second beta with respect to discount-rate shocks,
￿good beta￿ , because its price of risk is relatively low.
In this paper we ask whether ￿rms￿systematic risks are determined by the char-
acteristics of their cash ￿ ows, or whether instead they arise from the discount rates
that investors apply to those cash ￿ ows. We use bad and good betas as systematic
risk measures that are suggested by the two-beta model, but we do not test the impli-
cations of that model for the cross-section of average stock returns, instead treating
1the comovements of stocks with market cash ￿ ows and discount rates as objects of
inherent interest. We ￿rst study the systematic risks of value and growth stocks, and
then we examine other common movements in stock returns that can be predicted
using ￿rm-level equity market and accounting data.
At least since the in￿ uential work of Fama and French (1993), it has been under-
stood that value stocks and growth stocks tend to move together, so that an investor
who holds long positions in value stocks or short positions in growth stocks takes on
a common source of risk. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) argue that this common
risk should command a high price if their two-beta asset pricing model is correct.
Using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach to disentangle cash-￿ ow and discount-
rate shocks at the market level, they ￿nd that value stocks have relatively high bad
betas with market cash-￿ ow shocks. This pattern is consistent over time, but while
in the 1929-62 period value stocks also have relatively high good betas with market
discount-rate shocks, in the period since 1963 value stocks have relatively low good
betas and low overall betas with the market. Thus the high average return on value
stocks, which contradicts the CAPM in the post-1963 period (Ball, 1978; Basu, 1977,
1983; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1985; Fama and French 1992), is predicted by
the two-beta model if Campbell and Vuolteenaho￿ s VAR speci￿cation is correct.2
An open question is what determines the comovements of value and growth stocks.
One view is that value and growth stocks are exposed to di⁄erent cash-￿ ow risks.
Fama and French (1996), for example, argue that value stocks are companies that
are in ￿nancial distress and vulnerable to bankruptcy. Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004) suggest that growth stocks might have speculative investment opportunities
that will be pro￿table only if equity ￿nancing is available on su¢ ciently good terms;
thus they are equity-dependent companies of the sort modeled by Baker, Stein, and
Wurgler (2003). According to this fundamentals view, growth stocks move together
with other growth stocks and value stocks with other value stocks because of the
characteristics of their cash ￿ ows, as would be implied by a simple model of stock
valuation in which discount rates are constant.
The empirical evidence for the fundamentals view is mixed. Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1994) study long-horizon (up to 5-year) returns on value and growth
portfolios, which should re￿ ect cash-￿ ow shocks more than temporary shocks to dis-
count rates. They ￿nd little evidence that long-horizon value stock returns covary
2Chen and Zhao (2008) point out that changing the VAR speci￿cation can reverse this result, a
critique we address below.
2more strongly than long-horizon growth stock returns with the aggregate stock market
or the business cycle. On the other hand, Fama and French (1995) document com-
mon variation in the pro￿tability of value and growth stocks, and Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho (2008) ￿nd that value stocks￿pro￿tability covaries more strongly with
market-wide pro￿tability than does growth stocks￿pro￿tability. Bansal, Dittmar, and
Lundblad (2003, 2005) and Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005) use econometric methods
similar to those in this paper to show that value stocks￿cash ￿ ows have a higher
long-run sensitivity to aggregate consumption growth than do growth stocks￿cash
￿ ows.3
An alternative view is that the stock market simply prices value and growth stocks
di⁄erently at di⁄erent times. Cornell (1999) and Lettau and Wachter (2007), for
example, argue that growth stock pro￿ts accrue further in the future than value stock
pro￿ts, so growth stocks are longer-duration assets whose values are more sensitive
to changes in the market discount rate. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) argue that value stocks lack common fundamentals but
are merely those stocks that are currently out of favor with investors, while growth
stocks are merely ￿glamour stocks￿that are currently favored by investors. According
to this sentiment view, changes in investor sentiment￿ or equivalently, changes in the
discount rates that investors apply to cash ￿ ows￿ create correlated movements in the
prices of stocks that investors favor or disfavor.
In this paper, we set up direct tests of the fundamentals view against the sentiment
view, using several alternative approaches. Our ￿rst and simplest test avoids the
need for VAR estimation. We use accounting return on equity (ROE) to construct
direct proxies for ￿rm-level and market cash-￿ ow news, and the price-earnings ratio to
construct a proxy for market discount-rate news. Since ROE is subject to short-term
￿ uctuations, we lengthen the horizon to emphasize longer-term trends that correspond
more closely to the revisions in in￿nite-horizon expectations that are relevant for stock
prices. We consider a range of horizons from two to ￿ve years and show how the
choice of horizon in￿ uences the results. We ￿nd that at all these horizons, the ROE
of value stocks is more sensitive to the ROE of the market than is the ROE of growth
stocks, consistent with the ￿ndings of Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008). We also
report the novel result that in the period since 1963, the ROE of growth stocks is more
3Liew and Vassalou (2000) show that value-minus-growth returns covary with future macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. However, it is not clear that this result is driven by business-cycle variation
in the cash ￿ ows of value stocks; it could arise from correlation between discount rates and the
macroeconomy.
3sensitive to the market￿ s price-earnings ratio than is the ROE of value stocks. These
results support the fundamentals view that the risk patterns in value and growth
stock returns re￿ ect underlying patterns in value and growth stock cash ￿ ows.
In a second test, we estimate VARs for market returns in the manner of Campbell
(1991) and Campbell and Mei (1993), and for ￿rm-level returns in the manner of
Vuolteenaho (2002), to break market and ￿rm-level stock returns into components
driven by cash-￿ ow shocks and discount-rate shocks. This approach has the advan-
tage that if we have correctly speci￿ed our VARs, we can measure the discounted
e⁄ects of current shocks out to the in￿nite future, and not merely over the next few
years. We aggregate the estimated ￿rm-level shocks for those stocks that are included
in value and growth portfolios, and regress portfolio-level cash-￿ ow and discount-rate
news on the market￿ s cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news to ￿nd out whether fundamen-
tals or sentiment drive the systematic risks of value and growth stocks. According
to our results, the bad beta of value stocks and the good beta of growth stocks are
both determined primarily by their cash-￿ ow characteristics. To address the con-
cern of Chen and Zhao (2008) that VAR results are sensitive to the particular VAR
speci￿cation that is used, we consider several alternative market-level VARs.
In a third test, we continue to rely on VAR methodology but avoid portfolio
construction by running cross-sectional regressions of realized ￿rm-level betas onto
￿rms￿book-to-market equity ratios. We ￿nd that a ￿rm￿ s book-to-market equity
ratio predicts its bad beta positively and its good beta negatively, consistent with the
results of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). When we decompose each ￿rm￿ s bad
and good beta into components driven by the ￿rm￿ s cash-￿ ow news and discount-rate
news, we ￿nd that the book-to-market equity ratio primarily predicts the cash ￿ ow
component of the bad beta, not the discount-rate component.
All three tests tell us that the systematic risks of value and growth stocks are
determined by the properties of their cash ￿ ows. These results have important
implications for our understanding of the value-growth e⁄ect. While formal models
are notably lacking in this area, any structural model of the value-growth e⁄ect must
relate to the underlying cash-￿ ow risks of value and growth companies. Growth
stocks are not merely glamour stocks whose comovement is driven purely by correlated
sentiment. Our results show that there￿ s more to growth than just ￿glamour.￿
While Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) concentrate on value and growth port-
folios, the two-beta model has broader application. In Section 3 of this paper we
use cross-sectional stock-level regressions to identify the characteristics of common
4stocks that predict their bad and good betas. We look at market-based historical
risk measures, the lagged beta and volatility of stock returns; at accounting-based
historical risk measures, the lagged beta and volatility of a ￿rm￿ s return on assets
(ROA); and at accounting-based measures of a ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial status, including its
ROA, debt-to-asset ratio, and capital investment-asset ratio.
Accounting measures of stock-level risk are not emphasized in contemporary ￿-
nance research, but were sometimes used to evaluate business risk and estimate the
cost of capital for regulated industries in the period before the development of the
CAPM (Bickley 1959). This tradition has persisted in the strategic management lit-
erature. Bowman (1980), for example, used the variance of return on equity (ROE)
as a measure of risk, and documented a negative relationship between this risk mea-
sure and the average level of ROE. This ￿nding has come to be known as ￿Bow-
man￿ s paradox,￿since one normally expects to ￿nd a positive association between
risk and return; it has generated a large literature surveyed by Nickel and Rodriguez
(2002). Some papers in this literature have used alternative accounting measures
of risk including pro￿tability betas (Aaker and Jacobson, 1987) and leverage (Miller
and Bromiley, 1990).
Recently, Morningstar Inc. has used accounting data to calculate the costs of
capital for individual stocks in the Morningstar stock rating system. Morningstar
explicitly rejects the use of the CAPM and argues that accounting data may reveal in-
formation about long-run risk, very much in the spirit of Campbell and Vuolteenaho￿ s
￿bad beta￿ :
In deciding the rate to discount future cash ￿ ows, we ignore stock-
price volatility (which drives most estimates of beta) because we welcome
volatility if it o⁄ers opportunities to buy a stock at a discount to its fair
value. Instead, we focus on the fundamental risks facing a company￿ s
business. Ideally, we￿ d like our discount rates to re￿ ect the risk of per-
manent capital loss to the investor. When assigning a cost of equity to
a stock, our analysts score a company in the following areas: Financial
leverage - the lower the debt the better. Cyclicality - the less cyclical the
￿rm, the better. Size - we penalize very small ￿rms. Free cash ￿ ows -
the higher as a percentage of sales and the more sustainable, the better.
(Morningstar 2004.)
Even in the CAPM, accounting data may be relevant if they help one predict
5the future market beta of a stock. This point was emphasized by Beaver, Kettler,
and Scholes (1970) and Myers and Turnbull (1977) among others, and has in￿ uenced
the development of practitioner risk models. Our cross-sectional regressions show
that accounting data do predict market betas, consistent with the early results of
Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970). Importantly, however, some accounting variables
have disproportionate predictive power for bad betas, while lagged market betas and
volatilities of stock returns have disproportionate predictive power for good betas.
This result implies that accounting data are more important determinants of a ￿rm￿ s
systematic risk and cost of capital in the two-beta model than in the CAPM. The
best accounting predictors of bad beta are leverage and pro￿tability, two variables
that are emphasized by Morningstar although they are not the main focus of attention
in the strategic management literature.
Finally, we use the cross-sectional regression approach in combination with our
￿rm-level VAR methodology to predict the components of a ￿rm￿ s bad and good beta
that are determined by its cash ￿ ows and its discount rates. We ￿nd that stock-level
characteristics generally predict the cash-￿ ow components of a ￿rm￿ s bad and good
beta, not the discount-rate components. The systematic risks of stocks with similar
accounting characteristics are primarily driven by the systematic risks of their cash
￿ ows, an important extension of our ￿nding for growth and value stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the decom-
position of stock returns and presents our direct test of di⁄erences in the cash-￿ ow
risks of value and growth stocks. Section 2 explores these risks using a VAR approach.
This section presents aggregate and ￿rm-level VAR estimates, reports the decomposi-
tion of betas for value and growth portfolios implied by those estimates, and explores
the robustness of the decomposition to alternative VAR speci￿cations. Section 3
discusses cross-sectional regressions using ￿rm-level characteristics to predict good
and bad betas, and Section 4 concludes.
61 Decomposing Stock Returns and Risks
1.1 Two components of stock returns
The price of any asset can be written as a sum of its expected future cash ￿ ows,
discounted to the present using a set of discount rates. The price of the asset changes
when expected cash ￿ ows change, or when discount rates change. This holds true for
any expectations about cash ￿ ows, whether or not those expectations are rational, but
￿nancial economists are particularly interested in rationally expected cash ￿ ows and
the associated discount rates. Even if some investors have irrational expectations,
there should be other investors with rational expectations, and it is important to
understand asset price behavior from the perspective of these investors.
There are at least two reasons why it is interesting to distinguish between asset
price movements driven by rationally expected cash ￿ ows, and movements driven
by discount rates. First, investor sentiment can directly a⁄ect discount rates, but
cannot directly a⁄ect cash ￿ ows. Price movements that are associated with changing
rational forecasts of cash ￿ ows may ultimately be driven by investor sentiment, but
the mechanism must be an indirect one, for example working through the availability
of new ￿nancing for ￿rms￿investment projects. (See Subrahmanyam and Titman,
2001, for an example of a model that incorporates such indirect e⁄ects.) Thus
by distinguishing cash-￿ ow and discount-rate movements, we can shrink the set of
possible explanations for asset price ￿ uctuations.
Second, conservative long-term investors should view returns due to changes in
discount rates di⁄erently from those due to changes in expected cash ￿ ows (Merton,
1973; Campbell, 1993, 1996; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). A loss of current
wealth caused by an increase in the discount rate is partially compensated by im-
proved future investment opportunities, while a loss of wealth caused by a reduction
in expected cash ￿ ows has no such compensation. The di⁄erence is easiest to see
if one considers a portfolio of corporate bonds. The portfolio may lose value today
because interest rates increase, or because some of the bonds default. A short-
horizon investor who must sell the portfolio today cares only about current value, but
a long-horizon investor loses more from default than from high interest rates.
Campbell and Shiller (1988a) provide a convenient framework for analyzing cash-
￿ ow and discount-rate shocks. They develop a loglinear approximate present-value
7relation that allows for time-varying discount rates. Linearity is achieved by ap-
proximating the de￿nition of log return on a dividend-paying asset, rt+1 ￿ log(Pt+1+
Dt+1)￿log(Pt), around the mean log dividend-price ratio, (dt ￿ pt), using a ￿rst-order
Taylor expansion. Above, P denotes price, D dividend, and lower-case letters log
transforms. The resulting approximation is rt+1 ￿ k+￿pt+1+(1￿￿)dt+1￿pt ;where
￿ and k are parameters of linearization de￿ned by ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
1 + exp(dt ￿ pt)
￿
and
k ￿ ￿log(￿)￿(1￿￿)log(1=￿￿1). When the dividend-price ratio is constant, then
￿ = P=(P + D), the ratio of the ex-dividend to the cum-dividend stock price. The
approximation here replaces the log sum of price and dividend with a weighted aver-
age of log price and log dividend, where the weights are determined by the average
relative magnitudes of these two variables.
Solving forward iteratively, imposing the ￿no-in￿nite-bubbles￿terminal condition
that limj!1 ￿j(dt+j ￿ pt+j) = 0, taking expectations, and subtracting the current
dividend, one gets:
pt ￿ dt =
k
1 ￿ ￿
+ Et
1 X
j=0
￿
j[￿dt+1+j ￿ rt+1+j] ; (1)
where ￿d denotes log dividend growth. This equation says that the log price-dividend
ratio is high when dividends are expected to grow rapidly, or when stock returns are
expected to be low. The equation should be thought of as an accounting identity
rather than a behavioral model; it has been obtained merely by approximating an
identity, solving forward subject to a terminal condition, and taking expectations.
Intuitively, if the stock price is high today, then from the de￿nition of the return
and the terminal condition that the dividend-price ratio is non-explosive, there must
either be high dividends or low stock returns in the future. Investors must then expect
some combination of high dividends and low stock returns if their expectations are
to be consistent with the observed price.
Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-value approach to obtain a decom-
position of returns. Substituting (1) into the approximate return equation gives:
rt+1 ￿ Et rt+1 = (Et+1 ￿ Et)
1 X
j=0
￿
j￿dt+1+j ￿ (Et+1 ￿ Et)
1 X
j=1
￿
jrt+1+j (2)
= NCF;t+1 ￿ NDR;t+1;
where NCF denotes news about future cash ￿ ows (i.e., dividends or consumption), and
NDR denotes news about future discount rates (i.e., expected returns). This equation
8says that unexpected stock returns must be associated with changes in expectations
of future cash ￿ ows or discount rates. An increase in expected future cash ￿ ows is
associated with a capital gain today, while an increase in discount rates is associated
with a capital loss today. The reason is that with a given dividend stream, higher
future returns can only be generated by future price appreciation from a lower current
price.
If the decomposition is applied to the returns on the investor￿ s portfolio, these
return components can be interpreted as permanent and transitory shocks to the
investor￿ s wealth. Returns generated by cash-￿ ow news are never reversed subse-
quently, whereas returns generated by discount-rate news are o⁄set by lower returns
in the future. From this perspective it should not be surprising that conservative
long-term investors are more averse to cash-￿ ow risk than to discount-rate risk. Note
however that if an investor￿ s portfolio changes over time, the return decomposition
for the portfolio is not the same as the decomposition for the components that make
up the portfolio at a point in time. In the empirical work of this paper, we are careful
to decompose the returns to stocks that appear in value and growth portfolios at a
point in time, rather than the returns to a managed portfolio of such stocks whose
composition changes over time.
1.2 Decomposing betas
Previous empirical work uses the return decomposition (2) to investigate betas in sev-
eral di⁄erent ways. Campbell and Mei (1993) break the returns on stock portfolios,
sorted by size or industry, into cash-￿ ow and discount-rate components. They ask
whether the betas of these portfolios with the return on the market portfolio are deter-
mined primarily by their cash-￿ ow news or their discount-rate news. That is, for port-
folio i they measure the cash-￿ ow news Ni;CF;t+1 and the (negative of) discount-rate
news ￿Ni;DR;t+1, and calculate Cov(Ni;CF;t+1;rM;t+1) and Cov(￿Ni;DR;t+1;rM;t+1).
Campbell and Mei de￿ne two beta components:
￿CFi;M ￿
Covt(Ni;CF;t+1;rM;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ (3)
and
￿DRi;M ￿
Covt(￿Ni;DR;t+1;rM;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ ; (4)
9which add up to the traditional market beta of the CAPM,
￿i;M = ￿CFi;M + ￿DRi;M: (5)
In their empirical implementation, Campbell and Mei assume that the conditional
variances and covariances in (3) and (4) are constant. They do not look separately
at the cash-￿ ow and discount-rate shocks to the market portfolio.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), by contrast, break the market return into cash-
￿ ow and (negative of) discount-rate news, NM;CF;t+1 and ￿NM;DR;t+1. They measure
covariances Cov(ri;t+1;NM;CF;t+1) and Cov(ri;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1) and use these to de￿ne
cash-￿ ow and discount-rate betas,
￿i;CFM ￿
Covt (ri;t+1;NM;CF;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ (6)
and
￿i;DRM ￿
Covt (ri;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ ; (7)
which again add up to the traditional market beta of the CAPM,
￿i;M = ￿i;CFM + ￿i;DRM: (8)
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that the ICAPM implies a price of risk for
￿i;DRM equal to the variance of the return on the market portfolio, and a price of risk
for ￿i;CFM that is ￿ times higher, where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of a
representative investor. This leads them to call ￿i;DRM the ￿good￿beta and ￿i;CFM
the ￿bad￿ beta, where the latter is of primary concern to conservative long-term
investors.
Empirically, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) estimate a reasonable VAR speci-
￿cation that implies that value stocks have always had a considerably higher bad beta
than growth stocks. This ￿nding is surprising, since in the post-1963 sample value
stocks have had a lower CAPM beta than growth stocks. The higher CAPM beta of
growth stocks in the post-1963 sample is due to their disproportionately high good
beta. Campbell and Vuolteenaho also ￿nd that these properties of growth and value
stock betas can explain the relative average returns on growth and value during this
period. These results are dependent on the particular VAR system that Campbell
and Vuolteenaho estimate, and it is possible to specify other reasonable VAR systems
that deliver di⁄erent results (Chen and Zhao, 2008).
10In this paper we combine the asset-speci￿c beta decomposition of Campbell and
Mei (1993) with the market-level beta decomposition of Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004). We measure four covariances and de￿ne them as:
￿CFi;CFM ￿
Covt(Ni;CF;t+1;NM;CF;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ ; (9)
￿DRi;CFM ￿
Covt(￿Ni;DR;t+1;NM;CF;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ ; (10)
￿CFi;DRM ￿
Covt(Ni;CF;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ ; (11)
and
￿DRi;DRM ￿
Covt(￿Ni;DR;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1)
Vart
￿
rM;t+1
￿ : (12)
These four beta components add up to the overall market beta,
￿i;M = ￿CFi;CFM + ￿DRi;CFM + ￿CFi;DRM + ￿DRi;DRM: (13)
The bad beta of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) can be written as:
￿i;CFM = ￿CFi;CFM + ￿DRi;CFM; (14)
while the good beta can be written as:
￿i;DRM = ￿CFi;DRM + ￿DRi;DRM: (15)
This four-way decomposition of beta allows us to ask whether the high bad beta of
value stocks and the high good beta of growth stocks are attributable to their cash
￿ ows or to their discount rates.
An interesting early paper that explores a similar decomposition of beta is Pettit
and Wester￿eld (1972). Pettit and Wester￿eld use earnings growth as a proxy for
cash-￿ ow news, and the change in the price-earnings ratio as a proxy for discount-
rate news. They argue that stock-level cash-￿ ow news should be correlated with
market-wide cash-￿ ow news, and that stock-level discount-rate news should be corre-
lated with market-wide discount-rate news, but they assume zero cross-correlations
between stock-level cash ￿ ows and market-wide discount rates, and between stock-
level discount rates and market-wide cash ￿ ows. That is, they assume ￿DRi;CFM =
11￿CFi;DRM = 0 and work with an empirical two-way decomposition: ￿i;M = ￿CFi;CFM+
￿DRi;DRM. Comparing value and growth stocks, our subsequent empirical analysis
shows that there is interesting cross-sectional variation in ￿CFi;DRM, contrary to Pettit
and Wester￿eld￿ s assumption that this beta is always zero.
A recent paper that explores the four-way decomposition of beta, written subse-
quent to the ￿rst draft of this paper, is Koubouros, Malliaropulos, and Panopoulou
(2004). The authors estimate separate risk prices for each of the four components
of beta. Consistent with theory, they ￿nd that risk prices are sensitive to the use of
cash-￿ ow or discount-rate news at the market level, but not at the ￿rm or portfolio
level.
1.3 A direct measurement strategy
We begin by taking the most direct approach, constructing direct proxies for ￿rm-level
and market-level cash-￿ ow news, and for market-level discount-rate news.
Our ￿rm-level data come from the merger of three databases. The ￿rst of these,
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock ￿le, provides
monthly prices; shares outstanding; dividends; and returns for NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks. The second database, the Compustat annual research ￿le, con-
tains the relevant accounting information for most publicly traded U.S. stocks. The
Compustat accounting information is supplemented by the third database, Moody￿ s
book equity information for industrial ￿rms, as collected by Davis. Fama, and French
(2000). This database enables us to estimate cash-￿ ow news over the full period
since 1929. Our data end in 2001, enabling us to report results through the year
2000.
1.3.1 Portfolio construction
Our analysis is driven by a desire to understand the risk characteristics of publicly
traded companies. It is important to note that those risks cannot be measured
from the risk characteristics of cash ￿ ows generated by dynamic trading strategies.
The dividends paid by a dynamically rebalanced portfolio strategy may vary because
the dividends of the ￿rms in the portfolio change, but they may also vary if the
stocks sold have systematically di⁄erent dividend yields than stocks bought at the
12rebalance. For example, consider a dynamic strategy that buys non-dividend-paying
stocks in recessions and dividend-paying stocks in booms. The dividends earned by
this dynamic trading strategy will have a strong business-cycle component even if the
dividends of all underlying companies do not.4
Therefore, any sensible attempt to measure the risks of ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows at a
portfolio level must use a ￿three-dimensional￿data set, in which portfolios are formed
each year and then those portfolios are followed into the future for a number of years
without rebalancing. Such data sets have been used by Fama and French (1995) and
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003, 2008), and we adopt their methodology.
Each year we form quintile portfolios based on each ￿rm￿ s value as measured by
its book-to-market ratio BE=ME. We calculate BE=ME as book common equity
for the ￿scal year ending in calendar year t ￿ 1, divided by market equity at the end
of May of year t.5 We require the ￿rm to have a valid past BE=ME. Moreover, to
eliminate likely data errors, we discard those ￿rms with BE=MEs less than 0.01 and
greater than 100 at the time of the sort. When using Compustat as our source of
accounting information, we require that the ￿rm must be on Compustat for two years
before using the data. This requirement alleviates the potential survivor bias due to
Compustat back￿lling data.
Each portfolio is value-weighted, and the BE=ME breakpoints are chosen so that
the portfolios have the same initial market capitalization and therefore are all econom-
ically meaningful.6 Our de￿nition of the market portfolio is simply the value-weight
4A similar point applies to bond funds, which trade bonds over time and thus do not have the
simple cash-￿ ow properties of individual bonds. Chen and Zhao (2008) report a decomposition of
bond returns into cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news, but they ignore this issue and thus their analysis
is invalid.
5Following Fama and French (1992), we de￿ne BE as stockholders￿equity, plus balance sheet
deferred taxes (Compustat data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if available),
plus post-retirement bene￿t liabilities (data item 330) (if available), minus the book value of preferred
stock. Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or par
value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock. We calculate stockholders￿
equity used in the above formula as follows. We prefer the stockholders￿equity number reported
by Moody￿ s, or Compustat (data item 216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholders￿
equity as the book value of common equity (data item 60), plus the book value of preferred stock.
(Note that the preferred stock is added at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity
formula.) If common equity is not available, we compute stockholders￿equity as the book value of
assets (data item 6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from Compustat.
6The typical approach allocates an equal number of ￿rms to each portfolio. Since growth ￿rms
are typically much larger than value ￿rms, this approach generates value portfolios that contain only
13portfolio of all of the stocks that meet our data requirements. After portfolio forma-
tion, we follow the portfolios for ￿ve years keeping the same ￿rms in each portfolio
while allowing their weights to drift with returns as would be implied by a buy-and-
hold investment strategy. The long horizon is necessary since over the course of the
￿rst post-formation year the market learns about not only the unexpected component
of that year￿ s cash-￿ ow realizations but also updates expectations concerning future
cash ￿ ows. Because we perform a new sort every year, our ￿nal annual data set is
three dimensional: the number of portfolios formed in each sort times the number of
years we follow the portfolios times the time dimension of our panel.7
1.3.2 Proxies for cash-￿ ow news
To proxy for cash-￿ ow news, we use portfolio-level accounting return on equity (ROE).
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003, 2008) have argued for the use of the discounted
sum of ROE as a good measure of ￿rm-level cash-￿ ow fundamentals. Thus, our
ROE-based proxy for portfolio-level cash-￿ ow news is the following:
Ni;CF;t+1 =
K X
k=1
￿
k￿1roei;t;t+k, (16)
where roei;t;t+k is the log of real pro￿tability for portfolio i (1 for growth through 5
for value, and m for market), sorted in year t, measured in year t+k. We emphasize
longer-term trends rather than short-term ￿ uctuations in pro￿tability by examining
horizons (K) from two to ￿ve years.
Speci￿cally, we track the subsequent stock returns, pro￿tability, and book-to-
market ratios of our value and growth portfolios over the years after portfolio forma-
tion. We aggregate ￿rm-level book equities by summing the book-equity data for
each portfolio. We then generate our earnings series using the clean-surplus relation.
a small fraction of the capitalization of the market.
7Missing data are treated as follows. If a stock was included in a portfolio but its book equity is
temporarily unavailable at the end of some future year t, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s book-to-market
ratio has not changed from t ￿ 1 and compute the book-equity proxy from the last period￿ s book-
to-market and this period￿ s market equity. We treat ￿rm-level observations with negative or zero
book-equity values as missing. We then use the portfolio-level dividend and book-equity ￿gures in
computing clean-surplus earnings at the portfolio level.
14In that relation, earnings, dividends, and book equity satisfy:
BEt ￿ BEt￿1 = Xt ￿ D
net
t , (17)
where book value today equals book value last year plus clean-surplus earnings (Xt)
less (net) dividends. This approach is dictated by necessity (the early data consist of
book-equity series but do not contain earnings). We construct clean-surplus earnings
with an appropriate adjustment for equity o⁄erings so that:
Xt =
￿
(1 + Rt)MEt￿1 ￿ Dt
MEt
￿
￿ BEt ￿ BEt￿1 + Dt, (18)
where Dt is gross dividends, computed from CRSP.
The correct way to adjust pro￿tability for in￿ ation is somewhat unclear, because
both reported ROE and reported ROE less in￿ ation or the Treasury bill rate covary
strongly with the levels of in￿ ation and interest rates, suggesting that in￿ ation-related
accounting distortions make reported ROE a number that is neither purely real nor
purely nominal. Over the full sample, a regression of reported ROE on the level of the
Treasury bill rate, reported in the online Appendix, delivers a coe¢ cient of 0.4. We
use this estimated coe¢ cient to de￿ne roei;t;t+k = log(1+ROEi;t;t+k)￿0:4log(1+yt+k),
where ROEi;t;t+k ￿ Xi;t;t+K=BEi;t;t+K￿1 is the year t+k clean-surplus return on book
equity for portfolio i sorted at t, and yt+k is the Treasury bill return in year t+k. This
approach ensures that our measure of real pro￿tability is orthogonal to variations in
the nominal interest rate during our sample period; it is a reasonable compromise
between the view that reported ROE is a real number and the view that it is a
nominal number.8
1.3.3 Proxy for market discount-rate news
To proxy for discount-rate news at the market level, we use annual increments in the
market￿ s log P/E ratio, ln(P=E)M. This re￿ ects the ￿ndings of Campbell and Shiller
(1988a, 1988b), Campbell (1991), and others that discount-rate news dominates cash-
￿ ow news in aggregate returns and price volatility. The resulting news variable is:
8Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008) make no in￿ ation adjustment to reported ROE, implicitly
taking the stand that this is a real number. Their approach delivers results that are fairly similar to
those reported here. Thomas (2007) discusses the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on reported corporate earnings.
15￿NM;DR;t+1 =
K X
k=1
[￿
k￿1￿t+kln(P=E)M]: (19)
161.3.4 Direct beta measures
Figure 1 plots our proxies for the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news and discount-rate news
for the investment horizon of ￿ve years. The ￿gure shows some periods where both
cash ￿ ows and discount rates pushed stock prices in the same direction. In the
early 1930s, for example, cash-￿ ow news was negative and market discount rates
increased, driving down the market. In the late 1990s the same process operated in
reverse, and the market rose because cash ￿ ows improved and discount rates declined.
However, there are also periods where the two in￿ uences on market prices push in
opposite directions. In the mid-1970s, for example, cash-￿ ow news was positive while
discount rates were rising, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s cash-￿ ow news was
negative while discount rates were falling. Since we are interested in separating the
e⁄ects of discount-rate and cash-￿ ow news, periods of this latter sort are particularly
in￿ uential observations.
Table 1 reports the regression coe¢ cients of our portfolio-level proxies for cash-￿ ow
news onto our proxies for the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news and discount-rate news. We
break the sample into two subsamples, 1929-1962 and 1963-2000. The top two panels
of the table report regressions of portfolio-level cash-￿ ow news onto the market￿ s cash-
￿ ow news, ￿rst in the 1929-1962 period and then in the 1963-2000 period. The bottom
two panels repeat this exercise for regressions of portfolio-level cash-￿ ow news onto
the market￿ s discount-rate news.
In each panel of Table 1, the rows represent investment horizons from two to ￿ve
years, while the ￿rst ￿ve columns represent quintile portfolios sorted on the book-
to-market equity ratio, with extreme growth portfolios at the left and extreme value
portfolios at the right. The ￿nal column reports the di⁄erence between the extreme
growth and extreme value coe¢ cients.
Table 1 shows that growth stocks￿cash ￿ ows have lower betas with the market￿ s
cash-￿ ow news in both the 1929-1963 and 1963-2001 periods, while they have lower
betas with the market￿ s discount-rate news in the ￿rst period and higher betas in the
second period. This result is striking for two reasons. First, it reproduces the cross-
sectional patterns reported by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) without relying on
a VAR model. These patterns imply that a two-beta asset pricing model, with a
higher price of risk for beta with the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news, can explain both the
positive CAPM alpha for value stocks in the 1963-2001 period and the absence of
such an alpha in the 1929-1963 period.
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value and growth stocks, not the returns on these stocks. This implies that the
risks of value and growth stocks are derived in some way from the behavior of their
underlying cash ￿ ows, and do not result merely from shifts in investor sentiment.
1.3.5 Robustness
The online Appendix to this paper, Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008), reports
several robustness checks. First, we show that results are similar if we run multiple,
rather than simple, regressions on our two proxies for aggregate discount-rate news
and cash-￿ ow news. Second, we address the concern that our results may be driven
by predictable components in our discounted ROE sums.
One reason there may be predictable components is purely mechanical. We
compute clean-surplus ROE in the ￿rst year after the sort by using the change in
BE from t ￿ 1 to t. But that initial book equity is known many months before the
actual sort occurs in May of year t. Thus a portion of the cash￿ ows we are using to
proxy for cash-￿ ow news are known as of the time of the sort and cannot be news.
In response to this problem, we adjust our discounted ROE sums to start with ROE
in year t + 2 instead of year t + 1.
More generally it is possible that the level of our left-hand side variable is naturally
forecastable. We can include an additional independent variable to make sure that
this forecastability does not drive our results. As a ￿rm￿ s level of pro￿tability is
quite persistent, a natural control is the di⁄erence in past year t ROE for the ￿rms
currently in the extreme growth and extreme value portfolios.
The online Appendix shows that all these results are consistent with the general
pattern shown in Table 1.
182 A VAR Approach
2.1 VAR methodology
In this section we use a VAR approach to estimate cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news.
This approach allows us to calculate the e⁄ects of today￿ s shocks over the discounted
in￿nite future, without assuming that these e⁄ects die out after two to ￿ve years. It
also creates properly scaled news terms that add to the overall return, as implied by
the identity (2). We use the version of the VAR methodology proposed by Campbell
(1991), ￿rst estimating the terms Et rt+1 and (Et+1￿Et)
P1
j=1 ￿jrt+1+j and then using
realizations of rt+1 and Equation (2) to back out the cash-￿ ow news.
We assume that the data are generated by a ￿rst-order VAR model:
zt+1 = a + ￿zt + ut+1, (20)
where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its ￿rst element, a and ￿ are m-by-1
vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d. m-by-1 vector
of shocks. Of course, this formulation also allows for higher-order VAR models via a
simple rede￿nition of the state vector to include lagged values.
Provided that the process in Equation (20) generates the data, t+1 cash-￿ ow and
discount-rate news are linear functions of the t + 1 shock vector:
NDR;t+1 = e1
0￿ut+1; (21)
NCF;t+1 = (e1
0 + e1
0￿)ut+1:
Above, e1 is a vector with the ￿rst element equal to unity and the remaining el-
ements equal to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by ￿, de￿ned as
￿ ￿ ￿￿(I ￿ ￿￿)￿1: e10￿ captures the long-run signi￿cance of each individual VAR
shock to discount-rate expectations. The greater the absolute value of a variable￿ s
coe¢ cient in the return prediction equation (the top row of ￿), the greater the weight
the variable receives in the discount-rate-news formula. More persistent variables
should also receive more weight, which is captured by the term (I ￿ ￿￿)￿1.
Chen and Zhao (2008) claim that the results of this methodology are sensitive to
the decision to forecast expected returns explicitly and treat cash ￿ ows as a residual.
This claim is incorrect. The approximate identity linking returns, dividends, and
19stock prices, rt+1 ￿ k + ￿pt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)dt+1 ￿ pt, can be rewritten as rt+1 ￿ k ￿
￿(dt+1 ￿ pt+1) + (dt ￿ pt) + ￿dt+1. Thus a VAR that contains rt+1, (dt+1 ￿ pt+1),
and an arbitrary set of other state variables is equivalent to a VAR that contains
￿dt+1, (dt+1 ￿ pt+1), and the same set of other state variables. The two VARs will
generate exactly the same news terms. The news terms will be extremely similar
even if the log dividend-price ratio is replaced by some other valuation ratio that
captures the long-term variation in stock prices relative to accounting measures of
value. Of course, the news terms are sensitive to the other state variables in the
VAR system. Therefore, the important decision in implementing this methodology
is not the decision to forecast returns or cash ￿ ows, but the choice of variables to
include in the VAR, an issue we discuss below.
2.2 Aggregate VAR
In specifying the aggregate VAR, we follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) by
choosing the same four state variables. Consequently, our VAR speci￿cation is one
that has proven successful in cross-sectional asset pricing tests. However, we imple-
ment the VAR using annual data, rather than monthly data, in order to correspond
to our estimation of the ￿rm-level VAR, which is more naturally implemented using
annual observations.9
2.2.1 State variables
The aggregate-VAR state variables are de￿ned as follows. First, the excess log
return on the market (re
M) is the di⁄erence between the annual log return on the
CRSP value-weighted stock index (rM) and the annual log risk-free rate, constructed
by CRSP as the return from rolling over Treasury bills with approximately three
months to maturity. We take the excess return series from Kenneth French￿ s website
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
The term yield spread (TY ) is provided by Global Financial Data and is computed
as the yield di⁄erence between ten-year constant-maturity taxable bonds and short-
9Our annual series for the VAR state variables TY , PE, and V S are exactly equal to the corre-
sponding end-of-May values in Campbell and Vuolteenaho￿ s data set. We estimate the VAR over
the period 1928-2001, with 74 annual observations.
20term taxable notes, in percentage points. Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Campbell
(1987) point out that TY predicts excess returns on long-term bonds. These papers
argue that since stocks are also long-term assets, TY should also forecast excess stock
returns, if the expected returns of long-term assets move together. Fama and French
(1989) show that TY tracks the business cycle, so this variable may also capture
cyclical variation in the equity premium.
We construct our third variable, the log smoothed price-earnings ratio (PE), as
the log of the price of the S&P 500 index divided by a ten-year trailing moving
average of aggregate earnings of companies in the index. Graham and Dodd (1934),
Campbell and Shiller (1988b, 1998), and Shiller (2000) advocate averaging earnings
over several years to avoid temporary spikes in the price-earnings ratio caused by
cyclical declines in earnings. This variable must predict low stock returns over the
long run if smoothed earnings growth is close to unpredictable. We are careful to
construct the earnings series to avoid any forward-looking interpolation of earnings,
ensuring that all components of the time t earnings-price ratio are contemporaneously
observable. This is important because look-ahead bias in earnings can generate
spurious predictability in stock returns while weakening the explanatory power of
other variables in the VAR system, altering the properties of estimated news terms.
Fourth, we compute the small-stock value spread (V S) using the data made avail-
able by Kenneth French on his website. The portfolios, which are constructed at
the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market
equity, ME) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity
(BE=ME). The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the
end of June of year t. BE=ME for June of year t is the book equity for the last ￿scal
year end in t ￿ 1 divided by ME for December of t ￿ 1. The BE=ME breakpoints
are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. At the end of June of year t, we construct
the small-stock value spread as the di⁄erence between the log(BE=ME) of the small
high-book-to-market portfolio and the log(BE=ME) of the small low-book-to-market
portfolio, where BE and ME are measured at the end of December of year t ￿ 1.
We include V S because of the evidence in Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001), Camp-
bell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004) that relatively
high returns for small growth stocks predict low returns on the market as a whole.
This variable can be motivated by the ICAPM itself. If small growth stocks have
low and small value stocks have high expected returns, and this return di⁄erential
is not explained by the static CAPM, the ICAPM requires that the excess return of
21small growth stocks over small value stocks be correlated with innovations in expected
future market returns. There are other more direct stories that also suggest the small-
stock value spread should be related to market-wide discount rates. One possibility
is that small growth stocks generate cash ￿ ows in the more distant future and there-
fore their prices are more sensitive to changes in discount rates, just as coupon bonds
with a high duration are more sensitive to interest-rate movements than are bonds
with a low duration (Cornell, 1999; Lettau and Wachter, 2007). Another possibility
is that small growth companies are particularly dependent on external ￿nancing and
thus are sensitive to equity market and broader ￿nancial conditions (Ng, Engle, and
Rothschild, 1992; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). Finally, it is possible that
episodes of irrational investor optimism (Shiller, 2000) have a particularly powerful
e⁄ect on small growth stocks.
2.2.2 Aggregate VAR dynamics
Table 2 reports the VAR model parameters, estimated using OLS. Each row of the
table corresponds to a di⁄erent equation of the VAR. The ￿rst ￿ve columns report
coe¢ cients on the ￿ve explanatory variables: a constant, and lags of the excess market
return, term yield spread, price-earnings ratio, and small-stock value spread.
The ￿rst row of Table 2 shows that three out of our four VAR state variables
have some ability to predict annual excess returns on the aggregate stock market.
Unlike monthly returns that exhibit momentum, annual market returns display a
modest degree of reversal; the coe¢ cient on the lagged excess market return is a
statistically insigni￿cant -0.0354 with a t-statistic of -0.3. The regression coe¢ cient
on past values of the term yield spread is positive, consistent with the ￿ndings of Keim
and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), and Fama and French (1989), though the
associated t-statistic of 1.4 is modest. The smoothed price-earnings ratio negatively
predicts the return with a t-statistic of 2.6, consistent with the ￿nding that various
scaled-price variables forecast aggregate returns (Roze⁄, 1984; Campbell and Shiller,
1988ab, 1998; Fama and French, 1988, 1989). Finally, the small-stock value spread
negatively predicts the return with a t-statistic of 2.1, consistent with Brennan, Wang,
and Xia (2001) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004). In summary, the estimated
coe¢ cients, both in terms of signs and t-statistics, are generally consistent with our
prior beliefs and ￿ndings in previous research.
The remaining rows of Table 2 summarize the dynamics of the explanatory vari-
22ables. The term spread can be predicted with its own lagged value and the lagged
small-stock value spread. The price-earnings ratio is highly persistent, and approx-
imately an AR(1) process. Finally, the small-stock value spread is also a highly
persistent AR(1) process.
The sixth column of Table 2 computes the coe¢ cients of the linear function that
maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news, e10￿. We de￿ne ￿ ￿ ￿￿(I ￿ ￿￿)￿1,
where ￿ is the estimated VAR transition matrix from Table 2 , and we set ￿ equal to
.95.10
The persistence of the VAR explanatory variables raises some di¢ cult statistical
issues. It is well known that estimates of persistent AR(1) coe¢ cients are biased
downwards in ￿nite samples, and that this causes bias in the estimates of predictive
regressions for returns if return innovations are highly correlated with innovations
in predictor variables (Stambaugh, 1999). There is an active debate about the
e⁄ect of this on the strength of the evidence for return predictability (Lewellen, 2004;
Torous, Valkanov, and Yan, 2005; Campbell and Yogo, 2006; Polk, Thompson, and
Vuolteenaho, 2006; Ang and Bekaert, 2007). Our interpretation of the ￿ndings in this
literature is that there is some statistical evidence of return predictability based on
variables similar to ours. However, an additional complication is that the statistical
signi￿cance of the one-period return-prediction equation does not guarantee that our
news terms are not materially a⁄ected by the above-mentioned small-sample bias and
sampling uncertainty. This is because the news terms are computed using a nonlinear
transformation of the VAR parameter estimates.11 With these caveats, we proceed
with news terms extracted using the point estimates reported in Table 2. In the next
section of the paper, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative proxies
for these news terms.
10Results are robust to reasonable variation in ￿. The coe¢ cients of e10￿ are very similar to
those estimated by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) from monthly data, with the exception of the
coe¢ cient on the stock-return shock, which increases in absolute value in the annual VAR. As a
further robustness check, we compared our annual news terms to twelve-month sums of Campbell
and Vuolteenaho￿ s news terms and observed a high degree of consistency (a correlation of .98 for
NDR and .88 for NCF).
11The Appendix to Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), available online at
http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~campbell/papers/BBGBAppendix20040624.pdf, presents evi-
dence that there is little ￿nite-sample bias in the estimated news terms used in that paper.
232.3 Firm-level VAR
2.3.1 State variables
We implement the main speci￿cation of our ￿rm-level VAR with the following three
state variables, measured annually at the end of May each year. First, the log
￿rm-level return (ri) is the annual log value-weight return on a ￿rm￿ s common stock
equity.12 The log transformation of a ￿rm￿ s stock return may turn extreme values
into in￿ uential observations. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we avoid this problem
by unlevering the stock by 10%; that is, we de￿ne the stock return as a portfolio
consisting of 90% of the ￿rm￿ s common stock and a 10% investment in Treasury
bills.
Our second ￿rm-level state variable is the log book-to-market ratio for unlevered
equity, which we denote by BM in contrast to simple equity book-to-market BE=ME.
We measure BE for the ￿scal year ending in calendar year t ￿ 1, and ME (market
value of equity) at the end of May of year t. To avoid in￿ uential observations
created by the log transform, we ￿rst shrink the BE=ME towards one by de￿ning
BM ￿ log[(:9BE + :1ME)=ME].
We include BM in the state vector to capture the well-known value e⁄ect in the
cross-section of average stock returns (Graham and Dodd, 1934). In particular, we
choose book-to-market as our scaled price measure based on the evidence in Fama
and French (1992) that this variable subsumes the information in many other scaled
price measures concerning future relative returns.
Third, we calculate long-termpro￿tability, ROE, as the ￿rm￿ s average pro￿tability
over the last one to ￿ve years, depending on data availability. We de￿ne ROE as
the trailing ￿ve-year average of clean-surplus earnings from Equation (18), divided
by the trailing ￿ve-year average of (0:9BE + 0:1ME). We choose ROE as the ￿nal
element of our ￿rm-level state vector to capture the evidence that ￿rms with higher
pro￿tability (controlling for their book-to-market ratios) have earned higher average
stock returns (Haugen and Baker, 1996; Kovtunenko and Sosner, 2003). Vuolteenaho
(2002) uses just the previous year￿ s pro￿tability in his ￿rm-level VAR. We instead
12Annual returns are compounded from monthly returns, recorded from the beginning of June to
the end of May. We substitute zeros for missing monthly returns. Delisting returns are included
when available. For missing delisting returns where the delisting is performance-related, we assume
a -30% delisting return, following Shumway (1997). Otherwise, we assume a zero delisting return.
24average over as many as ￿ve years of past pro￿tability data due to the fact that unlike
Vuolteenaho, we use much noisier clean-surplus earnings instead of GAAP earnings.
The ￿rm-level VAR generates market-adjusted cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news
for each ￿rm each year. Since relatively few ￿rms survive the full time period; since
conditioning on survival may bias our coe¢ cient estimates; and since the average
number of ￿rms we consider is greater than the number of annual observations, we
assume that the VAR transition matrix is equal for all ￿rms and estimate the VAR
parameters with pooled regressions.
We remove year-speci￿c means from the state variables by subtracting rM;t from
ri;t and cross-sectional means from BMi;t and ROEi;t. Instead of subtracting the
equal-weight cross-sectional mean from ri;t, we subtract the log value-weight CRSP
index return instead, because this will allow us to undo the market adjustment simply
by adding back the cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news extracted from the aggregate
VAR.
After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the
￿rm-level VAR using WLS. Speci￿cally, we multiply each observation by the inverse
of the number of cross-sectional observations that year, thus weighting each cross-
section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated by the large cross
sections near the end of the sample period. We impose zero intercepts on all state
variables, even though the market-adjusted returns do not necessarily have a zero
mean in each sample. Allowing for a free intercept does not alter any of our results
in a measurable way.
2.3.2 Firm-level VAR dynamics
Parameter estimates, presented in Table 3, imply that expected returns are high when
past one-year return, the book-to-market ratio, and pro￿tability are high. Book-to-
market is the statistically most signi￿cant predictor, while the ￿rm￿ s own stock return
is the statistically least signi￿cant predictor. Expected pro￿tability is high when past
stock return and past pro￿tability are high and the book-to-market ratio is low. The
expected future book-to-market ratio is mostly a⁄ected by the past book-to-market
ratio.
These VAR parameter estimates translate into a function e10￿ that has positive
25weights on all state-variable shocks. The t-statistics on the coe¢ cients in e10￿ are
2.1 for past return, 2.6 for book-to-market, and 1.8 for pro￿tability. Contrasting the
￿rm-level e10￿ estimates to those obtained from the aggregate VAR of Table 2, it is
interesting to note that the partial relation between expected-return news and stock
return is positive at the ￿rm level and negative at the market level. The positive
￿rm-level e⁄ect is consistent with the literature on momentum in the cross-section of
stock returns.13
Table 3 also reports a variance decomposition for ￿rm-level market-adjusted stock
returns. The total variance of the return is the sum of the variance of expected-
return news (0.0048, corresponding to a standard deviation of 7%), the variance of
cash-￿ ow news (0.1411, corresponding to a standard deviation of 38%), and twice the
covariance between them (0.0046, corresponding to a correlation of 0.18). The total
return variance is 0.1551, corresponding to a return standard deviation of almost 40%.
Thus the ￿rm-level VAR attributes 97% of the variance of ￿rm-level market-adjusted
returns to cash-￿ ow news, and only 3% to discount-rate news. If one adds back the
aggregate market return to construct a variance decomposition for total ￿rm-level
returns, cash-￿ ow news accounts for 80% of the variance and discount-rate news for
20%. This result, due originally to Vuolteenaho (2002), is consistent with a much
lower share of cash-￿ ow news in the aggregate VAR because most ￿rm-level cash-￿ ow
news is idiosyncratic, so it averages out at the market level.
We construct cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news for our BE=ME-sorted portfolios
as follows. We ￿rst take the market-adjusted news terms extracted using the ￿rm-
level VAR in Table 3 and add back the market￿ s news terms for the corresponding
period. This add-back procedure scales our subsequent beta estimates, but does not
a⁄ect the di⁄erences in betas between stocks. Then, each year we form portfolio-level
news as the value-weighted average of the ￿rms￿news. The portfolios are constructed
by sorting ￿rms into ￿ve portfolios on their BE=ME￿ s each year. As before, we set
BE=ME breakpoints so that an equal amount of market capitalization is in each
quintile each year. As a result, we have series that closely approximate the cash-￿ ow
and discount-rate news on these quintile portfolios.
13Di⁄erences between the aggregate and ￿rm-level results may also re￿ ect the di⁄erent weighting
schemes in the VARs. The aggregate VAR uses value-weighted data, whereas the ￿rm-level VAR
weights ￿rms equally within each cross-section, and weights each cross-section equally.
262.4 Cash-￿ ow betas of value and growth stocks
Table 4 puts these extracted news terms to work. The ￿rst panel estimates the
bad cash-￿ ow betas (￿i;CF), and the fourth panel estimates the good discount-rate
betas (￿i;DR) for portfolios of value and growth stocks. We regress these portfo-
lios￿simple returns on the scaled news series NM;DR ￿ Var(re
M)=Var(NM;DR) and
NM;CF ￿Var(re
M)=Var(NM;CF). The scaling normalizes the regression coe¢ cients to
correspond to our de￿nitions of ￿i;DR and ￿i;CF, which add up to the CAPM beta.
The point estimates in Table 4 show that value stocks have higher cash-￿ ow betas
than growth stocks in both our subperiods. The estimated di⁄erence between the
extreme growth and value portfolios￿cash-￿ ow betas is ￿0:09 in the ￿rst subperiod
and ￿0:14 in the second. In contrast, the pattern in discount-rate betas changes
from one subperiod to another. Growth stocks￿discount-rate betas are signi￿cantly
below one in the early subperiod and greater than one in the later subperiod, while
value stocks￿discount-rate betas decline from 0.89 in the ￿rst subsample to 0.62 in
the second subsample. These numbers imply that value stocks have higher market
betas than growth stocks in the early subperiod, and lower market betas in the later
subperiod; but in the later subperiod the cash-￿ ow betas of value stocks remain high,
justifying their high CAPM alphas. All these patterns are consistent with those
found by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) using a monthly VAR.14
The standard errors in Table 4, as well as the standard errors in all subsequent
tables that use estimated news terms, require a caveat. We present the simple OLS
standard errors from the regressions, which do not take into account the estimation
uncertainty in the news terms. Thus, while the t-statistics in Table 4 are often high
in absolute value, the true statistical precision of these estimates is likely to be lower.
The remaining four panels of Table 4 use the portfolio-level and market-level news
terms to decompose the CAPM beta into four components: ￿CFi;CFM, ￿DRi;CFM,
14The full-period estimates of bad and good beta for the market portfolio sum up to approximately
one. Curiously, however, the sum of estimated bad and good betas is above one for the ￿rst
subperiod and below one for the second subperiod. The fact that these subperiod betas deviate
from one is caused by our practice of removing the conditional expectation from the market￿ s return
(NM;CF ￿ NM;DR equals the unexpected return) but not from the test asset￿ s return. Because the
aggregate VAR is estimated from the full sample, in the subsamples there is no guarantee that the
estimated conditional expected return is exactly uncorrelated with unexpected returns. Thus, in
the subsamples, the expected test-asset return may contribute to the beta, moving it away from
unity.
27￿CFi;DRM, and ￿DRi;DRM. For each portfolio, we run four simple regressions, of the
two portfolio-level news terms on two scaled market-level series NM;DR￿Var(re
M)=Var(NM;DR)
and NM;CF ￿Var(re
M)=Var(NM;CF). The portfolio i = 1 is the extreme growth port-
folio (low BE=ME) and i = 5 the extreme value portfolio (high BE=ME). In
the table, ￿1-5￿ denotes the di⁄erence between extreme growth (1) and value (5)
portfolios.
Table 4 shows that the cross-sectional patterns we have seen in ￿rms￿good and
bad betas are primarily due to cross-sectional variation in the cash-￿ ow components
of these betas: primarily ￿CFi;DRM, with some contribution also from ￿CFi;CFM. In
other words, value and growth stocks have di⁄erent systematic risks primarily because
their cash ￿ows covary di⁄erently with market news. Covariation of the discount
rates of value and growth stocks with market news, measured by the components
￿DRi;CFM and ￿DRi;DRM, is an important determinant of the overall level of betas,
but is approximately constant across value and growth portfolios. A similar result
holds for changes in betas over time. The beta components that are driven by ￿rms￿
cash ￿ ows are responsible for changes over time in the good and bad betas of growth
and value stocks.
Figure 2 presents a graphical summary of these results. The horizontal axis in
the ￿gure orders the portfolios from extreme growth at the left to extreme value at
the right. The top panel shows market beta and its four components for the 1929￿ 62
period, while the bottom panel repeats the exercise for the 1963￿ 2001 period. The
dominant importance of ￿CFi;DRM, the covariance of ￿rms￿cash-￿ ow news with the
market discount rate, is clearly visible both within and across the two panels of the
￿gure.
2.5 Robustness of the VAR approach
The results reported in Table 4 are striking, but it is important to establish that they
are robust to reasonable changes in speci￿cation. We do this in the online Appendix,
Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008), by varying the VAR speci￿cations we use.
282.5.1 Estimating the VAR over a subsample
A speci￿c concern is that the pattern in Table 4 may be the inevitable result of the
high share of ￿rm-level variance that is attributed to cash-￿ ow news, together with
the high share of market variance that is attributed to discount-rate news. It is
certainly true that these two components are of dominant importance, but we do
￿nd a larger share for discount-rate news in ￿rm-level variance when we estimate the
￿rm-level VAR over the 1963￿ 2001 period. In this VAR, the implied variance of
discount-rate news is 0.025, corresponding to a standard deviation of almost 16%,
and the variance of cash-￿ ow news is 0.166, corresponding to a standard deviation of
41%. Nonetheless we get the same cross-sectional pattern as in our baseline VAR: the
covariance of ￿rm-level cash ￿ ows with market discount rates is primarily responsible
for the variation in betas across value and growth portfolios.
2.5.2 Simple versus multiple regression
Another concern is that changes over time in simple betas may be in￿ uenced by
changes over time in the correlation between the two components of the market re-
turn. Suppose that the technology employed by value and growth ￿rms is such that
￿rms￿cash ￿ ows are determined by a constant linear function of the market-wide
discount-rate and cash-￿ ow news, plus an error term. Then, the simple regres-
sion coe¢ cients (and thus our beta decomposition) may be subject to change as the
correlation between the market￿ s news terms changes. In particular, the in-sample
correlation of NM;CF;t+1 and ￿NM;DR;t+1 is positive in the early subsample but slightly
negative in the modern subsample.
To examine the partial sensitivity of ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows to the market￿ s discount-
rate and cash-￿ ow news, in the Appendix we regress the portfolio-level cash-￿ ow
news on the estimated NM;CF;t+1 and ￿NM;DR;t+1 in a multiple regression. For
convenience, and to avoid an excessive notational burden, we continue to refer to these
multiple regression coe¢ cients as betas and write them as ￿CFi;CFM and ￿CFi;DRM,
even though they no longer correspond exactly to the simple regression betas that
determine risk premia in the ICAPM.
The multiple regression estimates of ￿CFi;CFM for growth and value stocks are
roughly constant over time and similar to the simple regression estimates. The
extreme growth stocks￿cash-￿ ow news has a beta with the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news
29of 0:07 in the early subsample and 0:03 in the second subsample, while the extreme
value stocks￿cash-￿ ow news has a beta with the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news of 0:13 in the
early subsample and 0:15 in the second subsample. Thus, the partial sensitivities to
the market￿ s cash-￿ ow news seem to be relatively stable over time, with value stocks￿
sensitivity at a higher level than that of growth stocks.
The multiple regression estimates of ￿CFi;DRM, by contrast, change across sam-
ples. In the early sample, value stocks￿cash ￿ ows are slightly more sensitive to
the market￿ s valuation levels than growth stocks￿cash ￿ ows (the 1 ￿ 5 di⁄erence is
￿0:11, with a t-statistic of ￿2:0). (This di⁄erence is not as economically and sta-
tistically signi￿cant as the corresponding simple regression results of Table 4, which
are in￿ uenced by the sample-speci￿c correlation of the market￿ s news terms.) In
the modern subsample, this pattern is reversed: growth stocks now have a higher
multiple-regression coe¢ cient on ￿NM;DR;t+1 than value stocks (the 1 ￿ 5 di⁄erence
is 0:44, with a t-statistic of 4:1).
2.5.3 Alternative aggregate VAR systems
It is well-known that VAR return decompositions depend on the forecasting variables
included in the VAR, and in general little can be said about how these decomposi-
tions change when additional variables are used.15 Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)
explore the sensitivity of their results to changes in VAR speci￿cation and report that
value stocks have higher bad betas than growth stocks only in VARs that include the
small-stock value spread (a variable that should be included if the ICAPM indeed
explains the value e⁄ect) and an aggregate valuation ratio with predictive power for
the aggregate market return.
We extend this sensitivity analysis by reporting results for two alternative aggre-
gate VAR systems. The ￿rst allows the two components of the small-stock value
spread, the log book-to-market equity ratios for small value and small growth stocks,
15As Campbell and Ammer (1993) put it, ￿In general there is no way to rule out the possibility that
investors may have information, omitted from our VAR, that a⁄ects the decomposition of variance....
In this case the VAR results must be interpreted more cautiously, as giving a variance decomposition
conditional on whatever information is included in the system.￿ Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay
(1997) give a textbook exposition: ￿When the constant-expected-return null hypothesis is false,
the VAR estimate of [the constant-discount-rate price] will in general depend on the information
included in the VAR. Thus one should be cautious in interpreting VAR estimates that reject the
null hypothesis.￿
30to enter the VAR system separately rather than together. The second replaces the
log price-smoothed earnings ratio with the log book-to-market ratio. The Appen-
dix reports the coe¢ cient estimates for these VARs. Portfolio-level cash-￿ ow news
estimates, constructed either from the ￿rm-level VAR or directly from 3- to 5-year
movements in portfolio-level ROE, are regressed on these alternative market news
series.
Results for the ￿rst alternative VAR system are extremely similar to those for
the benchmark VAR, and are robust to the use of a ￿rm-level VAR or direct proxies
for ￿rm-level cash-￿ ow news. Results for the second alternative VAR system are
also similar to the benchmark case when we use the ￿rm-level VAR to construct
￿rm-level cash-￿ ow news, but there are some di⁄erences when we use ￿rm-level cash-
￿ ow proxies. In this case we still ￿nd that the betas of growth stocks￿cash ￿ ows
have increased from the early period to the late period, and we still ￿nd that growth
stock cash ￿ ows have higher good betas with the market￿ s discount rate in the late
period, but we now ￿nd that growth stock cash ￿ ows also have higher bad betas
with the market￿ s cash ￿ ows in the late period. Thus, this speci￿cation does not
deliver a cash-￿ ow-based explanation of the beta patterns documented by Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004).
Chen and Zhao (2008) estimate several other reasonable VARs that imply lower
bad betas for value stocks than for growth stocks. They do not distinguish be-
tween the portfolio-level cash-￿ ow and discount-rate components of these bad betas.
Speci￿cally, Chen and Zhao show that value stocks have lower bad betas than growth
stocks in recent data if a valuation ratio is excluded from the VAR system, or if the
log price-smoothed earnings ratio is replaced with either the log price-earnings ratio
using current one-year earnings without smoothing, the level of the dividend-price
ratio, or the level of the book-to-market ratio. We have veri￿ed these results.
While our main purpose in this paper is not to respond in detail to Chen and
Zhao, we o⁄er four comments. First, some of Chen and Zhao￿ s speci￿cations merely
verify Campbell and Vuolteenaho￿ s (2004) report that a VAR system must include
an aggregate valuation ratio with predictive power for the aggregate market return if
it is to generate a higher bad beta for value stocks than for growth stocks. It is not
surprising that Campbell and Vuolteenaho￿ s results disappear in VAR speci￿cations
that exclude valuation ratios altogether, or that use a noisy ratio with little predictive
power such as the log price-earnings ratio without earnings smoothing, or that use a
31marginally predictive ratio such as the dividend-price ratio.16
Second, none of the speci￿cations that we have considered produce bad betas for
value stocks that are statistically signi￿cantly lower than the bad betas for growth
stocks, whereas some of them do produce bad betas for value stocks that are sta-
tistically signi￿cantly higher than the bad betas for growth stocks. The data are
clearly noisy, and the results vary with speci￿cation, but the reverse result is never
statistically signi￿cant.
Third, almost all the speci￿cations that produce lower bad betas for value stocks
than for growth stocks have the property that the spread in bad betas between value
stocks and growth stocks is much smaller than the spread in good betas. In other
words, the di⁄erences in CAPM betas between value stocks and growth stocks are
disproportionately accounted for by di⁄erences in good betas. This implies that the
two-beta asset pricing model can explain a positive CAPM alpha for value stocks,
even if it cannot account for a positive excess return on value stocks over growth
stocks.17
A fourth, related point is that almost all these speci￿cations deliver a much smaller
spread between bad and good betas in the 1929-1962 period than in the 1963-2001
period. Therefore the two-beta asset pricing model robustly explains the fact that
the CAPM ￿ts the cross-section of stock returns better in the earlier period than in
the later period.
3 Bad Beta, Good Beta, and Stock-Level Charac-
teristics
In this section, we run regressions predicting a ￿rm￿ s bad and good betas using annual
observations of ￿rm characteristics. Thus we no longer rely on portfolio construction
to reveal cross-sectional patterns in stock returns.
16In recent years the dividend-price ratio has been a⁄ected by a corporate shift away from dividends
and towards share repurchases. Boudoukh et al (2007) report that correcting for this e⁄ect improves
the predictive power of the dividend-price ratio for stock returns.
17The one exception to this statement is that a VAR with the level of the dividend-price ratio
generates equal spreads in bad and good betas between growth and value stocks. Including the log
of the dividend-price ratio recovers the unequal spread.
32We use two alternative approaches. Our ￿rst approach takes advantage of the fact
that estimating covariances is generally easier with higher frequency data. Speci￿cally,
we average the cross products of each ￿rm￿ s monthly simple returns with contempo-
raneous and one-month lagged monthly market news terms over all months within
the year in question. The use of lagged monthly news terms, following Scholes and
Williams (1977), captures sluggish responses of some stocks to market movements.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) ￿nd that this is important in estimating bad and
good betas, particularly for smaller stocks. Our regressions can be written as a
system:
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(22)
where t indexes years, j indexes months, i indexes ￿rms, and the dependent variables
in the three rows are ￿rm- and year-speci￿c ex post market beta, bad beta, and good
beta respectively.
In order to further split betas into components that are attributable to ￿rm-
speci￿c cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news, we are forced to turn to annual returns, as
the ￿rm-speci￿c return decomposition relies on the annual ￿rm-level VAR. In this
case we estimate:
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In either approach, we estimate simple regressions linking the components of ￿rms￿
risks to each characteristic, as well as multiple regression speci￿cations using all vari-
ables. We remove year-speci￿c means from both the dependent and independent
variables. After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we normalize each indepen-
dent variable to have unit variance. We then estimate regression coe¢ cients in
33Equations (22) and (23) using WLS. Speci￿cally, we multiply each observation by
the inverse of the number of cross-sectional observations that year, weighting each
cross-section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated by the large
cross-sections near the end of the sample period. Finally, we report every regres-
sion coe¢ cient after dividing by the estimated market return variance. As a result,
each coe¢ cient represents the e⁄ect on beta of a one-standard-deviation change in an
independent variable. The sample period for all regressions is the Compustat data
period, 1963￿ 2000, and we measure ￿rm characteristics at the end of May in each
year.
3.1 The value e⁄ect in stock-level regressions
As a ￿rst empirical exercise, we use stock-level regressions to recon￿rm the results
on value and growth stocks reported in the previous section. Table 5 shows the
coe¢ cients of simple regressions of annual cross-products onto market capitalization,
book-to-market equity ratios, and lagged market betas. The ￿rst column shows
the e⁄ect of each explanatory variable on market beta, the second and third columns
break this down into the e⁄ect on bad and good beta, and the fourth column reports
the fraction of the variable￿ s e⁄ect on market beta that is attributed to its e⁄ect on
bad beta. The last two columns of the table explore the four-way decomposition
into bad and good betas that are driven by ￿rm cash ￿ ows and ￿rm discount rates.
These columns report the fraction of each variable￿ s e⁄ect on bad and good beta,
respectively, that is accounted for by ￿rm-level cash ￿ ows.
The ￿rst four columns of Table 5 recon￿rm earlier ￿ndings about bad and good
betas. Large stocks typically have lower betas, and about 30% of the beta di⁄erence
is attributed to bad beta. Value stocks have lower betas than growth stocks in this
sample period, but this is entirely due to their lower good betas; value stocks actually
have slightly higher bad betas with market cash ￿ ows. Stocks with high past betas
have higher future betas, but this beta di⁄erence is entirely due to a di⁄erence in good
beta, not bad beta. These patterns were used by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)
to account for the size and value e⁄ects, and the excessively ￿ at security market line,
in recent decades.
The last two columns of Table 5 show that these beta patterns are driven by the
cash-￿ ow behavior of stocks sorted by size, value, and past beta. These characteristics
have very little ability to forecast the discount-rate behavior of stocks. Accordingly,
34we ￿nd cash-￿ ow shares close to one when decomposing good and bad beta into
components driven by the cash-￿ ow and discount-rate behavior of individual stocks.
Thus the cross-sectional regression approach con￿rms the portfolio results that we
reported in the previous section.18
3.2 Firm-level determinants of systematic risk
Within the cross-sectional regression approach, there is no reason to con￿ne our
attention to ￿rm characteristics such as value, size, and beta that have been found
to predict average stock returns. Instead, we can consider variables that have been
proposed as indicators of risk at the ￿rm level. We ￿rst run monthly regressions
in Table 6. These regressions give us relatively precise estimates but only allow us
to decompose market betas into their bad and good components. We then go on
to run annual regressions, which allow us to calculate four-way beta decompositions.
Table 7 reports regression results and the implied beta shares. All these tables use
multiple regressions; the online Appendix reports the corresponding simple regression
results.
In each of these tables, we consider variables that might be linked to cross-sectional
variation in systematic risk exposures. Rolling ￿rm-level monthly market-model
regressions are one obvious source of such characteristics, providing two measures.
The ￿rst measure of risk from this regression is estimated market beta, b ￿i;t. We
estimate betas using at least one and up to three years of monthly returns in an
OLS regression on a constant and the contemporaneous return on the value-weight
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ portfolio. We skip those months in which a ￿rm is missing
returns. However, we require all observations to occur within a four-year window.
As we sometimes estimate beta using only twelve returns, we censor each ￿rm￿ s
individual monthly return to the range (-50%,100%) to limit the in￿ uence of extreme
￿rm-speci￿c outliers. The residual standard deviation from these market-model
regressions, b ￿i;t, provides our second measure of risk.
We also generate intuitively appealing measures of risk from a ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows,
in particular from the history of a ￿rm￿ s return on assets, ROAi. We construct this
measure as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 18) over the
18In the Appendix we report similar results for multiple regressions that include size, book-market,
and lagged betas simultaneously.
35book value of assets (Compustat data item 6). First and most simply, we use a
￿rm￿ s most current ROAi as our measure of ￿rm pro￿tability. We then measure the
degree of systematic risk in a ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows by averaging the product of a ￿rm￿ s
cross-sectionally demeaned ROA with the marketwide (asset-weighted) ROA over
the last ￿ve years. We call this average cross product ￿
ROA. Our ￿nal pro￿tability
measure captures not only systematic but also idiosyncratic risk and is the time-series
volatility of each ￿rm￿ s ROA over the past ￿ve years, ￿i(ROAi).
Capital expenditure and book leverage round out the characteristics we use to
predict ￿rm risks. We measure investment as net capital expenditure￿ capital ex-
penditure (Compustat data item 128) minus depreciation (Compustat data item 14)￿
scaled by book assets, CAPXi=Ai. Book leverage is the sum of short- and long-term
debt over total assets, Debti=Ai. Short-term debt is Compustat data item 34 while
long-term debt is Compustat data item 9.
Table 6 shows that lagged market beta and idiosyncratic risk have strong pre-
dictive power for a ￿rm￿ s future market beta. Only 10% of this predictive power,
however, is attributable to bad beta. Thus sorting stocks on past equity market risk
measures does not generate a wide spread in bad beta. If the two-beta model of
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) is correct, this popular approach will not generate
accurate measures of the cost of capital at the ￿rm level.
Accounting variables can also be used to predict market betas at the ￿rm level.
The volatility of ROA, which has been the main focus of attention in the strate-
gic management literature following Bowman (1980), behaves like market-based risk
measures in that it primarily predicts good beta. The beta of ROA with aggregate
ROA is a relatively weak predictor of both bad and good beta, perhaps because it
is estimated using only ￿ve years of annual data and thus contains a great deal of
noise, a point emphasized by Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970). Other accounting
variables, however, do have strong explanatory power for bad beta. Around 40%
of the predictive power of leverage and investment for market beta is attributed to
the ability of these variables to predict bad beta. Pro￿table companies with high
ROA tend to have low market betas, and over two-thirds of this e⁄ect is attributed
to the low bad betas of these companies. These results support the emphasis of the
Morningstar stock rating system (Morningstar, 2004) on leverage and pro￿tability as
determinants of a company￿ s cost of capital.
Table 7 repeats these results using annual regressions that allow a four-way de-
composition of beta. The main results are consistent with Table 6, although with
36higher standard errors. Equity market risk measures primarily predict good beta,
while pro￿tability and leverage have substantial predictive power for bad beta. The
new ￿nding in these tables is that all these e⁄ects are attributed to the systematic
risks in company cash ￿ ows, rather than the systematic risk in company discount
rates. The cash-￿ ow shares in the last two columns of Table 7 are consistently close
to one. Systematic risks, as measured by ￿rm-level accounting data, seem to be
driven primarily by fundamentals.
4 Conclusion
This paper explores the economic origins of systematic risks for value and growth
stocks. The search for the sources of systematic risks is part of a broader debate,
going back at least to LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981), about the economic
forces that determine the volatility of stock prices.
The ￿rst systematic risk pattern we analyze is the ￿nding of Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004) that value stocks￿returns are particularly sensitive to permanent
movements in aggregate stock prices (driven by market-wide shocks to cash ￿ ows),
while growth stocks￿returns are particularly sensitive to temporary movements in
aggregate stock prices (driven by movements in the equity risk premium). We use
several tests to discover whether these patterns are driven by the behavior of value
and growth ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows, or the discount rates that investors apply to these cash
￿ ows.
In a ￿rst test, we use movements in pro￿tability over several years to proxy for
￿rm-level and market news about cash ￿ ows, and movements in the market price-
earnings ratio to proxy for market news about discount rates. We regress ￿rm-level
cash-￿ ow news proxies onto market cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news proxies. In
a second test, we use a ￿rm-level VAR to break annual ￿rm-level returns of value
and growth stocks into components driven by cash-￿ ow shocks and discount-rate
shocks. We then aggregate these components for value and growth portfolios. We
regress portfolio-level cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news on the market￿ s cash-￿ ow and
discount-rate news to ￿nd out whether sentiment or cash-￿ ow fundamentals drive
the systematic risks of value and growth stocks. In response to concerns about the
robustness of VAR methods recently expressed by Chen and Zhao (2008), we con-
duct a careful sensitivity analysis. In a third test, we run cross-sectional ￿rm-level
37regressions of ex post beta components onto the book-to-market equity ratio.
All three of these approaches give a similar answer: the high annual betas of
growth stocks with the market￿ s discount-rate shocks, and of value stocks with the
market￿ s cash-￿ ow shocks, are determined by the cash-￿ ow fundamentals of growth
and value companies. Thus, growth stocks are not merely ￿glamour stocks￿whose
systematic risks are purely driven by investor sentiment.
This paper also begins a broader exploration of ￿rm-level characteristics that pre-
dict ￿rms￿sensitivities to market cash-￿ ow and discount-rate shocks. Using monthly
and annual data, we ￿nd that historical return betas and return volatilities strongly
predict ￿rms￿ sensitivities to market discount rates, but are much less useful for
predicting sensitivities to market cash ￿ ows. Accounting variables, however, par-
ticularly the return on assets and the debt-asset ratio, are important predictors of
￿rms￿sensitivities to market cash ￿ ows. This ￿nding implies that accounting data
should play a more important role in determining a ￿rm￿ s cost of capital in a two-beta
model like that of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), which stresses the importance
of cash-￿ ow sensitivity, than in the traditional CAPM. A large literature in strategic
management has emphasized accounting measures of risk, although not the particular
measures that appear to be most e⁄ective in predicting ￿rms￿sensitivities to market
cash ￿ ows; our ￿nding o⁄ers partial support to this tradition.
Finally, we show that the e⁄ects of ￿rm characteristics on ￿rm sensitivities to
market cash ￿ ows and discount rates operate primarily through ￿rm-level cash ￿ ows
rather than through ￿rm-level discount rates. This result generalizes our ￿nding for
growth and value stocks, and suggests that fundamentals have a dominant in￿ uence
on cross-sectional patterns of systematic risk in the stock market.
Our empirical results challenge both rational and behavioral ￿nance theorists.
The results do not imply that investor sentiment has no e⁄ect on the comovement of
stock prices. But they do rule out a story in which the stock market is a sideshow,
and investor sentiment causes certain types of stocks to move together without regard
for the underlying comovement of cash ￿ ows. Any model in which sentiment cre-
ates common variation in stock prices must explain how sentiment generates common
variation in corporate pro￿tability. Similarly, fundamental models of stock prices
must confront the tendency for value and growth stocks to display correlated move-
ments in pro￿tability, and more generally the ability of accounting variables to predict
comovements in pro￿tability at the ￿rm level.
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44Table 1: Direct ￿rm-level cash-￿ ow news proxies on direct market news proxies
The table reports sub-period multiple regression betas of cash-￿ ow-news proxies on
the market￿ s discount-rate and cash-￿ ow news proxies for quintile portfolios formed
each year by sorting ￿rms on year-t BE/ME. We allocate 20% of the market￿ s value
to each of the ￿ve value-weighted portfolios. The portfolio Growth is the extreme
growth portfolio (low BE/ME) and Value the extreme value portfolio (high BE/ME).
￿G-V￿denotes the di⁄erence between extreme growth and value portfolios. BE/ME
used in sorts is computed as year t ￿ 1 BE divided by May-year-t ME. Each port-
folio￿ s cash-￿ ow news is directly proxied by
PK
k=1 ￿k￿1[roei;t;t+k ￿:4￿log(1+rf;t+k)],
where roei;t;t+k is log(1 + ROEi;t;t+k), with ROEi;t;t+k the year t + k clean-surplus
return on book equity (for portfolio i sorted at t) and rf;t+k the Treasury-bill return. PK
k=1[￿k￿1￿t+k ln(P=E)] and
PK
k=1 ￿k￿1[roeM;t+k ￿ :4 ￿ log(1 + rf;t+k)] are used as
direct proxies for the market￿ s discount-rate and cash-￿ ow news, where ￿t+k ln(P=E)
is the change in log smoothed price-earnings ratio from t + k ￿ 1 to t + k.
Growth 2 3 4 Value G-V
￿CFi;CFM: 1929-1962
K=2 0.64 0.94 0.77 0.93 1.04 -0.41
(2.98) (11) (13) (7.43) (50) (-1.78)
K=3 0.53 0.99 0.75 0.93 1.04 -0.51
(5.80) (14) (14) (14) (46) (-4.90)
K=4 0.52 0.94 0.72 1.00 1.03 -0.51
(5.56) (20) (15) (22) (44) (-4.34)
K=5 0.54 0.90 0.73 0.97 1.05 -0.51
(5.71) (18) (14) (65) (38) (-3.96)
￿CFi;CFM: 1963-2000
K=2 0.34 0.90 1.32 0.88 0.91 -0.55
(0.66) (5.13) (4.89) (9.83) (5.93) (-.90)
K=3 0.43 1.09 1.27 1.00 0.88 -0.45
(0.87) (7.10) (7.02) (6.26) (10) (-0.82)
K=4 0.63 1.18 1.21 1.22 0.88 -0.25
(1.38) (8.37) (7.13) (5.99) (12) (-0.46)
K=5 0.92 1.21 1.34 1.23 0.88 0.02
(1.72) (6.94) (7.51) (5.79) (15) (0.03)
￿CFi;DRM: 1929-1962
K=2 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.10
(-0.72) (-2.01) (0.37) (-1.90) (4.58) (-1.09)
K=3 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.01
(-0.17) (-1.69) (1.71) (-1.50) (1.24) (-0.19)
K=4 0.01 -0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.01
(0.12) (-3.76) (1.94) (-1.74) (1.98) (-0.10)
K=5 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.02
(-0.07) (-3.13) (1.35) (0.57) (1.38) (-0.22)
￿CFi;DRM:1963-2000
K=2 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.14
(0.64) (0.15) (-0.41) (-3.01) (-1.87) (1.08)
K=3 0.20 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.31
(1.95) (1.40) (-0.21) (-1.66) (-4.46) (3.02)
K=4 0.24 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.33
(2.30) (1.16) (-0.85) (-2.02) (-4.23) (2.90)
K=5 0.23 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 0.32
(2.09) (0.67) (-1.74) (-1.39) (-4.64) (2.46)Table 2: Aggregate VAR parameter estimates
The table shows the OLS parameter estimates for a ￿rst-order aggregate VAR model
including a constant, the log excess market return (re
M), term yield spread (TY ), log
price-earnings ratio (PE), and small-stock value spread (V S). Each set of two rows
corresponds to a di⁄erent dependent variable. The ￿rst ￿ve columns report coe¢ -
cients on the ￿ve explanatory variables, the sixth column reports the corresponding
adjusted R2, and the last column shows the resulting estimates of the coe¢ cients
of the linear function, e10￿, that maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news. In
that function, e1 is a vector with the ￿rst element equal to unity and the remaining
elements equal to zeros and ￿ ￿ ￿￿(I ￿ ￿￿)￿1, where ￿ is the point estimate of the
VAR transition matrix and ￿ is the linearization parameter, which we set equal to
.95. Thus, the market￿ s NDR is computed as e10￿u and NCF as (e10 + e10￿)u where
u is the matrix of residuals from the VAR. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample period for the dependent variables is 1928-2001 resulting in 74 annual data
points.
constant re
M;t TY t PEt V St R
2
e10￿
re
M;t+1 .8967 -.0354 .0643 -.2133 -.1642 10.80% -.1010
(log excess market return) (.2982) (.1142) (.0456) (.0811) (.0778) (.0322)
TY t+1 -.0479 .0250 .3437 -.1303 .5173 30.60% .0372
(term yield spread) (.7059) (.2778) (.1095) (.1945) (.1874) (.0259)
PEt+1 .6345 .0810 .0478 .8354 -.1149 70.23% -.8530
(log price-earnings ratio) (.2715) (.1066) (.0419) (.0750) (.0750) (.1264)
V St+1 .3166 .0291 -.0429 -.0515 .9133 81.32% -.2178
(small-stock value spread) (.2164) (.0856) (.0335) (.0599) (.0574) (.1481)
46Table 3: Firm-level VAR parameter estimates
The table shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for a ￿rst-order ￿rm-level VAR
model. The model state vector includes the log stock return (r), log book-to-market
(BM), and ￿ve-year average pro￿tability (ROE). All three variables are market-
adjusted, r by subtracting rM and BM and ROE by removing the respective year-
speci￿c cross-section means. Rows corresponds to dependent variables and columns
to independent (lagged dependent) variables. The ￿rst three columns report coe¢ -
cients on the three explanatory variables, the fourth column reports the corresponding
R2, and the last column shows the resulting estimates of the coe¢ cients of the linear
function, e10￿, that maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news. In that function,
e1 is a vector with ￿rst element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal
to zeros and ￿ ￿ ￿￿(I ￿ ￿￿)￿1, where ￿ is the point estimate of the VAR transi-
tion matrix and ￿ is the linearization parameter, which we set equal to .95. Thus,
￿rm-speci￿c news Ni;DR is computed as e10￿ui and Ni;CF as (e10 + e10￿)ui where
ui is the ￿rm-speci￿c matrix of residuals from the VAR. The table also shows the
variance-covariance matrix of these news terms, which in turn implies a variance de-
composition of market-adjusted ￿rm-level returns. Speci￿cally, the total variance of
the return is 0.1551 which corresponds to the sum of the variance of expected-return
news (0.0048), the variance of cash-￿ ow news (0.1411), and twice the covariance be-
tween the two news components (0.0046). Standard errors (in parentheses) take
into account clustering in each cross section. The sample period for the dependent
variables is 1929-2001, resulting in 72 annual cross-sections and 158,878 ￿rm-years.
ri;t BMi;t ROEi;t R2 e10￿
ri;t+1 .0655 .0410 .0817 0.28% .0803
(log stock return) (.0375) (.0156) (.0443) (.0381)
BMi;t+1 .0454 .8631 -.0499 72.22% .2075
(log book-to-market) (.0278) (.0238) (.0517) (.0807)
ROEi;t+1 .0217 -.0249 .6639 58.45% .2004
(￿ve-year pro￿tability) (.0045) (.0033) (.0306) (.1112)
Variance-Covariance Matrix Ni;DR Ni;CF
Expected-return news (Ni;DR) .0048 .0046
(.0037) (.0080)
Cash-￿ ow news (Ni;CF) .0046 .1411
(.0080) (.0191)Table 4: Firm-level news and the market￿ s cash-￿ ow and discount-rate news
The table reports the ￿rm-level news components of the "good" discount-rate and
"bad" cash-￿ ow betas measured for BE/ME-sorted portfolios in Table 1. These com-
ponents are ￿DRi;DRM =
Cov(￿Ni;DR;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1)
Var(rM;t+1) ; ￿CFi;DRM =
Cov(Ni;CF;t+1;￿NM;DR;t+1)
Var(rM;t+1) ;
￿DRi;CFM =
Cov(￿Ni;DR;t+1;NM;CF;t+1)
Var(rM;t+1) , and ￿CFi;CFM =
Cov(Ni;CF;t+1;NM;CF;t+1)
Var(rM;t+1) : The mar-
ket￿ s NDR and NCF are extracted using the VAR of Table 2. To construct portfolio
news terms, ￿rm-level Ni;DR and Ni;CF are ￿rst extracted from the market-adjusted
￿rm-level panel VAR of Table 3, then the corresponding market-wide news terms are
added back, and ￿nally the resulting ￿rm-level news terms are value-weighted. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) ignore estimation uncertainty in the extraction of the
news terms.
Growth 2 3 4 Value G-V
￿i;CFM: Growth and value ￿NDR+ NCF on the market￿ s NCF
1929-1962 .14 .15 .16 .18 .22 -.09
(3.5) (3.4) (3.9) (4.5) (4.4) (-3.5)
1963-2000 -.01 .05 .08 .13 .12 -.14
(-.21) (.95) (1.63) (2.76) (2.81) (-3.03)
￿DRi;CFM: Growth and value ￿NDR on the market￿ s NCF
1929-1962 .08 .08 .08 .08 .09 -.02
(1.8) (1.7) (1.9) (1.8) (2.0) (-2.7)
1963-2000 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.00
(-.80) (-.78) (-.72) (-.71) (-.69) (-.87)
￿CFi;CFM: Growth and value NCF on the market￿ s NCF
1929-1962 .06 .07 .08 .09 .13 -.07
(4.9) (7.0) (6.8) (6.3) (8.7) (-3.3)
1963-2000 .03 .09 .12 .17 .16 -.13
(1.2) (8.8) (10) (9.3) (5.8) (-3.0)
￿i;DRM: Growth and value ￿NDR+ NCF on the market￿ s ￿NDR
1929-1962 .66 .72 .70 .69 .89 -.23
(14.5) (17.8) (14.5) (12.6) (12.8) (-3.5)
1963-2000 1.07 .91 .81 .73 .62 .45
(1.07) (.90) (.81) (.73) (.62) (.45)
￿DRi;DRM: Growth and value ￿NDR on the market￿ s ￿NDR
1929-1962 .66 .69 .69 .72 .73 -.07
(45) (69) (78) (53) (88) (-5.3)
1963-2000 .94 .95 .95 .97 .97 -.03
(68) (103) (114) (93) (91) (-1.8)
￿CFi;DRM: Growth and value NCF on the market￿ s ￿NDR
1929-1962 .00 .03 .01 -.03 .16 -.16
(-.02) (.63) (.29) (-.42) (2.3) (-2.7)
1963-2000 .13 -.05 -.15 -.24 -.35 .48
(1.92) (-.89) (-2.4) (-2.6) (-3.6) (4.0)Table 5: Predicting beta￿ s components: ￿rm-level simple regressions, annual covari-
ances
The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of ￿rm-level simple regressions fore-
casting the annual cross products (NDR + NCF) ￿ (NCF;i + NDR;i), (NCF) ￿ (NCF;i +
NDR;i), and (NDR)￿(NCF;i +NDR;i) in columns 1, 2, and 3. As the regression coe¢ -
cients are divided by the estimated market annual return variance, these regressions
essentially forecast ￿rms￿betas (￿i) as well as their bad (￿i;CFM) and good (￿i;DRM)
components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta and ￿rm-level-CF share of
those estimates in columns 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The market￿ s NDR and NCF are
extracted using the VAR of Table 2. All variables are market-adjusted by removing
the corresponding year-speci￿c cross-section mean. Independent variables, described
in the text, are normalized to have unit variance. All t-statistics (in parentheses)
and standard errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take into account
clustering in each cross-section but do not account for the estimation uncertainty in
extraction of the market￿ s news terms.
Forecasting regressions Shares
￿i ￿i;CFM ￿i;DRM
￿i;CFM
￿i
￿CFi;CFM
￿i;CFM
￿CFi;DRM
￿i;DRM
(Market Beta) (Bad Beta) (Good Beta)
MEi -0.130 -0.040 -0.090 0.306 0.993 0.851
(size) (-1.54) (-1.91) (-1.23) [0.16] [0.07] [0.08]
0.39% 0.30% 0.20%
BEi=MEi -0.075 0.008 -0.083 -0.107 1.178 1.028
(book-to-market ratio) (-1.86) (0.81) (-2.27) [0.17] [0.33] [0.07]
0.14% 0.01% 0.18%
￿i 0.174 0.000 0.174 -0.003 1.775 0.865
(market beta) (2.21) (-0.02) (2.45) [0.11] [36.01] [0.02]
0.71% 0.00% 0.76%
49Table 6: Predicting beta￿ s components: ￿rm-level multiple regressions, monthly co-
variances
The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of ￿rm-level multiple regressions
annually forecasting the subsequent average monthly cross products (NDR;t+NCF;t+
NDR;t￿1 + NCF;t￿1) ￿ (Ri;t), (NCF;t + NCF;t￿1) ￿ (Ri;t), and (NDR;t + NDR;t￿1) ￿ (Ri;t).
As the regression coe¢ cients are divided by the estimated market monthly return
variance, these regressions essentially forecast ￿rms￿betas (￿i) as well as their bad
(￿i;CFM) and good (￿i;DRM) components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta
share of those estimates in column 4. The market￿ s NDR and NCF are the monthly
news terms from Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). All variables are market ad-
justed by removing the corresponding year-speci￿c cross-section mean. Independent
variables, described in the text, are scaled to have unit variance. All t-statistics (in
parentheses) and standard errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take
into account clustering in each cross-section but do not account for the estimation
uncertainty in extraction of the market￿ s news terms.
Forecasting regressions Shares
￿i ￿i;CFM ￿i;DRM
￿i;CFM
￿i
(Market Beta) (Bad Beta) (Good Beta)
￿i 0.1212 0.0117 0.1095 0.10
(market beta) (4.37) (1.85) (4.26) [0.05]
￿i(ri) 0.1207 0.0040 0.1167 0.03
(idiosyncratic risk) (3.70) (0.46) (4.24) [0.07]
￿
ROA
i -0.0060 0.0036 -0.0096 -0.60
(pro￿tability beta) (-0.32) (1.16) (-0.47) [1.67]
￿i(ROAi) 0.0579 0.0099 0.0479 0.17
(pro￿tability volatility) (5.44) (2.82) (4.48) [0.06]
ROAi -0.0316 -0.0216 -0.0100 0.68
(￿rm pro￿tability) (-1.90) (-3.95) (-0.51) [0.46]
Debti=Ai 0.0197 0.0073 0.0125 0.37
(book leverage) (1.63) (2.03) (1.17) [0.20]
CAPXi=Ai -0.0154 -0.0060 -0.0095 0.39
(capital expenditure) (-1.89) (-2.00) (-1.36) [0.19]
3.89% 0.60% 3.33%Table 7: Predicting beta￿ s components: ￿rm-level multiple regressions, annual covari-
ances
The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of ￿rm-level multiple regressions
forecasting the annual cross products (NDR+NCF)￿(NCF;i+NDR;i), (NCF)￿(NCF;i+
NDR;i), and (NDR)￿(NCF;i +NDR;i) in Columns 1, 2, and 3. As the regression coe¢ -
cients are divided by the estimated market annual return variance, these regressions
essentially forecast ￿rms￿betas (￿i), as well as their bad (￿i;CFM) and good (￿i;DRM)
components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta and ￿rm-level-CF share of
those estimates in Columns 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The market￿ s NDR and NCF are
extracted using the VAR of Table 2. All variables are market adjusted by removing
the corresponding year-speci￿c cross-section mean. Independent variables, described
in the text, are normalized to have unit variance. Regression coe¢ cients are scaled by
an estimate of the market￿ s variance. All t-statistics (in parentheses) and standard
errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take into account clustering in
each cross-section but do not account for the estimation uncertainty in extraction of
the market￿ s news terms.
Forecasting regressions Shares
￿i ￿i;CFM ￿i;DRM
￿i;CFM
￿i
￿CFi;CFM
￿i;CFM
￿CFi;DRM
￿i;DRM
(Market Beta) (Bad Beta) (Good Beta)
￿i 0.092 -0.002 0.093 -0.020 1.277 0.840
(market beta) (3.05) (-0.21) (3.23) [0.10] [1.88] [0.04]
￿i(ri) 0.090 0.012 0.077 0.135 0.927 0.964
(idiosyncratic risk) (1.45) (1.27) (1.39) [0.08] [0.08] [0.04]
Beta
ROA
i 0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.859 0.148 2.584
(pro￿tability beta) (0.10) (-0.57) (0.20) [9.31] [1.49] [8.78]
￿i(ROAi) 0.045 0.003 0.042 0.060 1.574 0.961
(pro￿tability volatility) (2.20) (0.35) (2.22) [0.16] [1.80] [0.05]
ROAi 0.021 0.011 0.009 0.549 1.372 1.161
(￿rm pro￿tability) (1.02) (1.69) (0.55) [0.42] [0.34] [0.91]
Debti=Ai 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.488 0.663 0.889
(book leverage) (0.70) (1.18) (0.43) [0.54] [0.29] [0.46]
CAPXi=Ai -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 0.080 1.643 0.950
(capital expenditure) (-0.48) (-0.16) (-0.47) [0.47] [4.59] [0.17]
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Figure 1: The ￿gure plots direct proxies for aggregate return news. Speci￿cally, the
proxies are
P5
k=1[￿k￿1￿t+k ln(P=E)] and
P5
k=1 ￿k￿1[roeM;t+k ￿ :4 ￿ log(1 + rf;t+k)]
for ￿NM;DR (line with squares) and NM;CF (thick solid line) respectively, where
￿t+k ln(P=E) is the change in log smoothed price-earnings ratio from t + k ￿ 1 to
t+k; ROEM;t;t+k is the year t+k clean-surplus return on book equity, and rf;t+k the
Treasury-bill return. The two time series are demeaned.
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Figure 2: This picture plots the components of beta for portfolios sorted by BE/ME,
reported in Table 4. Growth portfolios are shown at the left, and value portfolios
at the right. The thick solid line is the market beta, the thick solid line with circles
is ￿CFi;DRM, the thin solid line is ￿DRi;DRM, the dashed line is ￿CFi;CFM, and the
dotted line is ￿DRi;CFM:
53